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Abstract 
Carbon budgets, which define the total allowable CO2 emissions associated with a 
given global climate target, are a useful way of framing the climate mitigation 
challenge. In this paper, we review the geophysical basis for the idea of a carbon 
budget, showing how this concept emerges from a linear climate response to 
cumulative CO2 emissions. We then ǲ2-only ǳ2-induced warming, and an ǲǳ
human emissions. We present estimates for the CO2-only and effective carbon 
budgets for 1.5 and 2 °C, based on both model simulations and updated 
observational data. Finally, we discuss the key contributors to uncertainty in carbon 
budget estimates, and suggest some implications of this uncertainty for decision-
making. Based on the analysis presented here, we argue that while the CO2-only 
carbon budget is a robust upper bound on allowable emissions for a given climate 
target, the size of the effective carbon budget is dependent on the how quickly we 
are able to mitigate non-CO2 greenhouse gas and aerosols emissions. This suggests 
that climate mitigation efforts could benefit from being responsive to a changing 
effective carbon budget over time, as well as to potential new information that could 
narrow uncertainty associated with the climate response to CO2 emissions. 
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Introduction 
An important recent development in climate science is the finding that warming 
responds approximately linearly to cumulative CO2 emissions over time (Matthews 
et al. 2009; Allen et al. 2009; Gillett et al. 2013; Collins et al. 2013; Friedlingstein et 
al. 2014). This proportionality between cumulative emissions and global 
temperature change opens new avenues for how we approach climate mitigation 
(Matthews et al. 2012; Zickfeld et al. 2009), as well as our ability to predict the 
regional climate impacts associated with a given emission pathway (Leduc et al. 
2016). Importantly, this allows us to estimate a global carbon budget, which 
represents the total quantity of CO2 that can be emitted if we want to avoid 
exceeding a desired level of global temperature increase (Collins et al. 2013; 
Friedlingstein et al. 2014).  
Setting a finite budget of allowable CO2 emissions is a simple and easily understood 
way of framing the global climate challenge and the national emissions pathways 
that would be consistent with international climate targets (Gignac & Matthews 
2015; Raupach et al. 2014). However, there is a high level of confusion surrounding 
the use and estimates of carbon budgets in the scientific literature, which hampers 
their utility for climate policy development. The confusion stems from inconsistent 
methodologies and definitions among published carbon budget estimates, as well as 
from fundamental scientific uncertainties associated with estimating the climate 
response to a given quantity of emissions (Rogelj et al. 2016). Furthermore, there 
has been virtually no research focussed on estimating carbon budgets for less than 
2 °C of global warming; this is an urgent research gap that needs to be filled to ǯǲg the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue  ?Ǥ ? ?ǳ (Article 2 of the Paris Climate 
Agreement, available at: 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf).  
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In this paper, we review the scientific basis of carbon budget estimates, focusing on 
how the concept of allowable emissions can be inferred from known (though 
uncertain) geophysical constraints emerging from the climate response to 
cumulative CO2 emissions. We begin by discussing the climate response to CO2 
emissions alone, and the resulting carbon budget estimates associated with a given 
amount of CO2-induced warming. We then show how this CO2-only budget can be 
adjusted to account for the effect of non-CO2 greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions, 
which results in an ǲǳestimate of the total CO2 emissions associated with a 
given climate target. Finally, we discuss the important contributors to uncertainty in 
carbon budget estimates, and the implications of this uncertainty for emissions 
targets. Throughout, we focus on the climate targets of 1.5Ȃ2 °C above pre-industrial, 
as stipulated in the Paris Climate Agreement. 
 
Geophysical basis for a carbon budget 
The climate response to CO2 emissions is well characterized by a linear temperature 
response to cumulative emissions of CO2 over time (Matthews et al. 2009; Allen et al. 
2009; Gillett et al. 2013; Collins et al. 2013; Friedlingstein et al. 2014; MacDougall & 
Friedlingstein 2015; MacDougall 2016). The slope of this relationship Ȃ the 
temperature change per unit emission of CO2 Ȃ has now been defined as the ǲ CO2 ǡǳ (Gillett et al. 
2013; Collins et al. 2013; Gregory et al. 2009). Analyses of the climate response to 
cumulative emissions have shown that the TCRE remains approximately constant 
for total emissions up to several thousand giga-tonnes of carbon (GtC), and is highly 
path-independent in that the value of the TCRE shows only a small variation across 
a wide range of CO2 emission scenarios (Zickfeld et al. 2012; Matthews & Zickfeld 
2012; Leduc et al. 2015; Tokarska et al. 2016). 
 
Another important feature of the climate and carbon cycle system is the fast climate 
response to CO2 emissions (Ricke & Caldeira 2014; Matthews & Solomon 2013; 
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Zickfeld & Herrington 2015). This response time was recently quantified by Ricke 
and Caldeira (2014) who showed that the peak warming occurs 10 years after a 100 
GtC pulse emission of CO2. Zickfeld and Herrington (2015) further showed that the 
climate response time varies as a function of the size of the emission pulse, such that 
larger pulse sizes as associated with a longer response time. By extension, the 
climate response to small changes in CO2 emissions should be effectively 
instantaneous (Matthews & Solomon 2013).  
 
This fast climate response time to small changes in CO2 emissions supports a third 
important feature of the climate response to CO2 emissions: that the unrealized 
warming associated with past CO2 emissions is small (Matthews & Caldeira 2008). ǲ-
Emissions Cǳ (ZEC), which represents the amount of additional warming 
that occurs after CO2 emissions have been set to zero. Analyses of the ZEC across a 
range of different climate models suggest that there is little (if any) unrealized 
warming associated with past CO2 emissions, but rather that global temperature 
remain approximately constant for several centuries after CO2 emissions reach zero 
(Zickfeld et al. 2013; Matthews & Caldeira 2008; Matthews & Zickfeld 2012; 
Solomon et al. 2009; Lowe et al. 2009; Matthews & Weaver 2010; Gillett et al. 2011; 
Nohara et al. 2015). This arises as a result of the near-cancellation of opposing 
inertial effects associated with ocean heat and carbon uptake. In the case of constant 
atmospheric CO2, ocean thermal inertia would lead to continued warming for 
decades to centuries; however, in the context of zero CO2 emissions, the continued 
uptake of CO2 by the ocean leads to declining atmospheric CO2 concentrations which 
largely cancels the effect of ocean thermal inertia and results in near-constant global 
temperature over time (Matthews & Solomon 2013; Matthews & Weaver 2010). 
This relative balance of ocean thermal and carbon cycle inertia does vary among 
models, though while some models show larger amounts of unrealized warming 
(Frölicher & Paynter 2015), the occurrence of substantial continued warming after 
zero emissions is generally restricted to simulations driven by very high (>2000 
GtC) levels of cumulative emissions (Frölicher et al. 2014; Zickfeld & Herrington 
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2015; Leduc et al. 2015; Nohara et al. 2013). This body of literature therefore 
suggests that the quantity of emissions produced to date is consistent with the CO2-
induced warming that has already occurred, with little additional expected future 
warming commitment, and also little recovery from current levels of warming on 
centennial timescales.  
 
The concept of a carbon budget Ȃ the total allowable CO2 emissions consistent with a 
given amount of global temperature increase Ȃ is therefore a robust measure of 
human-climate influence that emerges from these three properties of the climate-
carbon cycle system: (1) that global temperature responds linearly to cumulative 
CO2 emissions, as defined by the TCRE; (2) that the climate response time to CO2 
emission is fast; and (3) that the realized warming associated with total CO2 
emissions to date is approximately the same as the centennial-scale legacy of these 
same emissions. As a consequence, the total amount of CO2 emissions as inferred 
from the TCRE is uniquely associated with remaining below a given level of CO2-
induced warming on timescales of 10 to several hundred years. This quantity has 
been defined ǲ2-ǳto represent the total allowable CO2 
emissions associated with a given amount of CO2-only warming (Rogelj et al. 2016). 
And in the case of low temperature targets, the CO2-only budget is consistent with 
both meeting and also not exceeding the targeted amount of CO2-induced 
temperature change. That is, there is little difference here between the budgets 
associated with exceeding or avoiding 1.5Ȃ2 °C (i.e. the threshold exceedance or 
threshold avoidance budgets, as defined by Rogelj et al, 2016).   
 
Estimates of CO2-only carbon budgets 
 
The CO2-only carbon budget can be understood simply as the inverse of the TCRE. 
While the TCRE equals  ?T/ET ( ? ?T = 
cumulative emissions over time), the carbon budget per degree of warming = ETȀ ?Ǥ
The CO2-only carbon budget for a given climate target (T*) is therefore T*/TCRE. 
This simple relationship between the TCRE and the CO2-only carbon budget is 
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shown in Figure 1. 
 
The TCRE can be estimated from either Earth system models (ESMs) that include a 
dynamic representation of the global carbon cycle, or from the observational record. 
Across the current generation of climate models, as represented by the ESMs 
included in the CMIP5 model ensemble, the TCRE varies from 0.8Ȃ2.4 °C/1000 GtC 
(Gillett et al. 2013), with an median value of 1.6 °C/1000 GtC [calculated from CO2-
only simulations with CO2 concentrations increasing by 1% per year].  
 
Estimating the TCRE from the observational record requires first identifying the 
proportion of observed warming attributable to CO2 alone, and then calculating the 
TCRE as a function of observed CO2-induced warming and historical cumulative CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels and land-use change. Applying this approach, Gillett et al. 
(2013) estimated an observationally-constrained (5-95%) TCRE range of 0.7Ȃ
2.0 °C/1000 GtC, with a best-estimate of 1.35 °C/1000 GtC.  
 
The CO2-only carbon budgets estimates associated with these TCRE values are 
summarized in Table 1. The model-average TCRE of 1.6 °C/1000 GtC suggests a 
global carbon budget of 625 GtC per degree, or 940 Gt C and 1250 Gt C for 1.5 and 
2 °C of CO2-induced warming, respectively. [Note: all carbon budget values are 
rounded to the nearest 5 GtC]. By contrast, the observationally-based TCRE of 
1.35 °C/1000 GtC suggests a larger carbon budget of 740 GtC per degree, or 1110 
GtC and 1480 GtC for 1.5 and 2 °C of CO2-induced warming. It is clear that 
differences in the sensitivity of the climate system to CO2 emission, as illustrated 
here by the difference between model- and observationally-based TCRE estimates, 
can have a large effect on the size of the CO2-only carbon budgets for 1.5Ȃ2 °C.  
 
Influence of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and aerosols 
 
The CO2-only carbon budget is well grounded in the science of the climate system 
response to cumulative CO2 emissions, and can be easily estimated from the TCRE. 
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However, the real climate system is also influenced by non-CO2 greenhouse gas and 
aerosol emissions, as well as changes in surface albedo due to land-use. The effect of 
non-CO2 emissions is complicated by the large number of individual forcing agents, 
which have widely varying atmospheric lifetimes that are in general considerably 
shorter than that of CO2. While the climate response to CO2 is well characterized by 
the TCRE, and similar relationships have been proposed for other long-lived 
greenhouse gases (Smith et al. 2012), there is no simple linear scaling factor that can 
be applied to all non-CO2 emissions. Although scientifically robust, the CO2-only 
carbon budget is not by itself enough to inform efforts to meet climate targets, as it 
does not account for the additional net warming expected from these other 
emissions. It is important therefore to adjust the CO2-only carbon budget to account 
for non-CO2 emissions and related warming. 
 
According to the IPCC forcing estimates, non-CO2 forcing Ȃ including the combined 
effect of all non-CO2 greenhouse gases and aerosols Ȃ currently accounts for 23% of 
the total anthropogenic forcing (Myhre et al. 2013) [here, values from 1750-2011 
from Myhre et al. (2013) were extended to 2015 using observations from the NOAA 
greenhouse gas index (http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/aggi/aggi.html) and 
adopting RCP6 percentage trends over 2011-2015 for the other anthropogenic 
forcing agents (Meinshausen et al. 2011); from 2011 to 2015 greenhouse gas forcing 
increased by 5% and non-greenhouse forcings changed very little]. Using the 
simplifying assumption that this ratio of forcings approximately represents the ratio 
of contributions to historical warming, we infer that about 77% of the observed 
warming up to the year 2015 can be attributed CO2 forcing, with the remaining 
observed warming attributable to non-CO2 emissions. We can then define an ǲǳtemperature response to cumulative 
CO2 emissions, adjusted to implicitly include the effect of non-CO2 forcing. 
 
The effective TCRE can be estimated from observations as: TCREeff  ? ?obs / ET,  ?obs is the observed human-induced global temperature change and ET 
represents the cumulative historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and land-use 
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change. To represent the human contribution to observed warming, we use the ǲGlobal ǳ (GWI) (Otto et al. 2015; Haustein et al. 2016), which allows 
us to remove the effect of particularly warm or cold individual years on the estimate 
of human-induced climate change. When updated to the end of 2015, the GWI gives 
an observed human-induced temperature increase of 0.99°C, relative to the 1861-
1880 average(Haustein et al. 2016). Total historical CO2 emissions between 1870 
and 2015 are 555 GtC (Le Quéré et al. 2015), which gives a TCREeff of 1.78 °C/1000 
GtC (0.99 °C / 555 Gt C).  
 
The effective TCRE is therefore an estimate of the warming caused by a given 
quantity of CO2 emissions, scaled upwards to account for the additional warming 
from non-CO2 emissions. The ratio of TCRE to TCREeff should therefore be equal to 
the ratio of CO2 to total anthropogenic forcing. Using the observationally-based best 
estimate for the TCRE of 1.35 °C/1000 GtC, we can see that the ratio of TCRE to 
TCREeff is 1.35/1.78 = 0.76, which is consistent with the current ratio of CO2 to total 
anthropogenic forcing taken from the IPCC forcing estimates (see Figure 2). Updated 
estimates of year-2015 anthropogenic warming, CO2 emissions and anthropogenic 
forcing therefore support Gillett et al ( ? ? ? ?Ȍǯ
1.35 °C/1000 GtC, and a corresponding TCREeff of 1.78 °C/1000 GtC. 
 
An alternate method to estimate the TCREeff would be to scale the CMIP5 model-
based TCRE according to the ratio of CO2 to total forcing as simulated by this model 
ensemble, again assuming that temperature response is approximately proportional 
to forcing. As plotted in Figure 2, CO2 makes up about 86% of total anthropogenic 
forcing at the year 2015 in the CMIP5 models; this value is consistent with the 
ensemble-average for RCP scenarios 8.5, 4.5 and 2.6, noting that there is some 
variation in the ratio of CO2 to total forcing among scenarios, and also among 
individual CMIP5 models for a particular RCP scenario (Meinshausen et al. 2011). 
Using the CMIP5 TCRE of 1.6 °C/1000 GtC, this results in a TCREeff of 1.6/0.86 = 
1.86 °C/1000 GtC. This model-based TCREeff suggests an observed warming of 
1.03°C at the end of 2015 (1.86 °C/1000 GtC * 555 GtC) which, while slightly higher 
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than the GWI best estimate of 0.99°C for this date, is well within the 5-95% 
uncertainty range of the GWI (Ȃ0.14 to +0.22 °C) (Haustein et al. 2016). It is worth 
noting that the difference between the model-based and observationally-based 
estimate of the TCREeff (1.86 vs. 1.78 °C/1000 GtC) is smaller than the difference for 
the CO2-only TCRE (1.6 vs. 1.35 °C/1000 GtC). This smaller TCREeff difference is 
explained by a smaller total anthropogenic forcing (about 0.3 W/m2) in the CMIP5 
ensemble compared to the IPCC forcing estimate, which in turn reflects an overall 
larger negative aerosol forcing in the CMIP5 models compared to the IPCC forcing 
data. As a result, the ratio of CO2 to total forcing is larger in the CMIP5 models than 
the IPCC forcing data, as can be seen in Figure 2. This highlights the important role 
of aerosol forcing uncertainty in particular as a constraint on our ability to validate 
TCREeff estimates against the observational record. 
 
These estimates of the TCREeff can be used to estimate an effective carbon budget, 
which represents the total quantity of CO2 emissions that is consistent with a given 
climate target, while allowing for additional non-CO2 warming. Using the 
observationally-based TCREeff of 1.78 °C/1000 GtC suggests an effective carbon 
budget of 560 GtC per degree, or 845 GtC for 1.5 °C and 1125 GtC for 2 °C. Using the 
model-based TCREeff of 1.86 °C/1000 GtC results in an effective carbon budget of 
540 GtC per degree, or 805 GtC for 1.5 °C and 1075 GtC for 2 °C (see Table 2). 
 
These effective carbon budgets, as derived either from models or from historical 
data, are therefore a first-order estimate of the quantity of CO2 that would be 
consistent with 1.5 or 2 °C of global warming, allowing for a portion of this warming 
to come from additional non-CO2 emissions. This calculation implicitly assumes that 
the ratio of CO2 to total anthropogenic forcing will remain approximately constant 
as we approach these targets. There are important caveats to this assumption, 
however, that limit the utility of this simple TCRE-based derivation of effective 
carbon budgets.  
 
In general, CO2 forcing will continue to increase until the point that global CO2 
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emissions drop below the level of natural sinks; at the point that we reach 1.5 or 
2 °C of global warming, the level of CO2 in the atmosphere will therefore necessarily 
be higher than today. The assumption of a constant ratio of CO2 to total forcing 
would only be consistent with a scenario of a net increase in non-CO2 forcing, at a 
rate comparable to the rate of increase in CO2 forcing. This is a plausible assumption 
for the next decade or two, as expected decreases in global aerosol emissions (and 
associated negative forcing) are likely to result in a near-term increase in net non-
CO2 forcing. However, it is unlikely that non-CO2 forcing will continue to increase, 
given that efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions are unlikely to be applied only 
to CO2 and not also to other non-CO2 greenhouse gases. We therefore argue that in 
the context of ambitious mitigation scenarios that are consistent with 1.5Ȃ2 °C 
climate targets, it is very likely that by the time we reach 1.5 or 2 °C of climate 
warming, net non-CO2 forcing will be smaller than today, and consequently that the 
ratio of CO2 to total anthropogenic forcing will increase over time (as is the case for 
the RCP2.6 scenario, as shown in Figure 2).  
 
This in turn means that the effective carbon budget for 1.5Ȃ2 °C will likely increase 
over time, becoming larger than the values given in Table 2; for example, if we were 
successful in mitigating non-CO2 emissions rapidly enough such the ratio of CO2 to 
total forcing were to increase to 0.93 (the maximum value in RCP2.6), this would 
imply an effective carbon budget of 580 GtC per degree (870 GtC for 1.5 °C; 1165 
GtC for 2 °C) based on the model-based TCRE of 1.6 °C/1000 GtC and the resulting 
TCREeff of 1.72 °C/1000 GtC at the time that we reach 1.5 or 2 °C. We suggest 
therefore that the TCREeff, and associated effective carbon budget, be treated as 
quantities that will change over time in response to our own climate policy 
decisions regarding non-CO2 mitigation. This time and scenario-dependence of the 
effective carbon budget is plotted in Figure 3, which shows that the range of non-
CO2 mitigation across the RCP scenarios results in an effective carbon budget range 
of 90 GtC per degree, or about 17% of the estimate based on year-2015 forcing 
ratios.  
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Key contributions to carbon budget uncertainty 
 
The values given above represent best estimates of the TCRE and associated TCREeff 
based on currently-available model output and observational data. While the 
observationally-constrained estimates could arguably be considered to be the more 
reliable of the two (Gillett et al. 2013), the model-based estimates are also 
consistent with the range of uncertainty associated with observed temperature 
changes and should therefore be considered to be a similarly plausible 
representation of the climate response to cumulative human CO2 emissions. We 
therefore suggest here that the range of values between the observationally- and 
model-based estimates shown in Table 2 should be taken as a range of best 
estimates of the effective carbon budgets for 1.5Ȃ2 °C. These values are considerably 
larger than most previous carbon budget estimates (IPCC 2014; Friedlingstein et al. 
2014; Rogelj et al. 2016), though are consistent with a recent reassessment of 
CMIP5 model results in light of observed temperature changes (Millar, Fuglestvedt, 
et al. 2016). 
 
However, in the context of setting emissions targets for a given level of global 
temperature increase, these best estimates are only consistent with a 50% chance of 
remaining below the desired level of global warming. Given the large uncertainty in 
the climate response to emissions, increasing the confidence level associated with 
meeting a climate target (e.g. to a 67% chance) can result in a substantial decrease 
in allowable emissions. For example, if the model-based range of TCRE is assumed 
to represent a Gaussian distribution with 5th and 95th percentiles of 0.8 and 
2.4 °C/1000 GtC, this would mean that the TCRE has a 67% chance of being less than 
1.8 °C/1000 GtC and a 90% chance of being less than 2.2 °C/1000 GtC. The increase 
in confidence from a 50 to 67% chance in remaining below the desired climate 
target requires using a 12.5% higher value for the TCRE, and results in a 
corresponding decrease in the carbon budget for a given climate target (i.e. by 70 
GtC per °C of target). Similarly, increasing the confidence from 50 to 90% decreases 
the carbon budget by about 27% (170 GtC per degree). For comparison, the 
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difference between the model-based CO2-only and effective carbon budgets 
(reflecting the effect of accounting for non-CO2 warming) is 85 Gt C (Table 1 vs. 
Table 2). 
 
This idea of assigning a likelihood of meeting a climate target given some carbon 
budget has been used in most previous assessments of carbon budgets associated 
with different levels of climate change (Friedlingstein et al. 2014; Rogelj et al. 2016). 
However, the method accounts for only one source of quantified uncertainty: the 
uncertainty associated with the climate response to CO2 emissions. This implicitly 
includes the contribution of climate sensitivity (or more precisely, transient climate 
response) uncertainty, as well as the uncertainty associated with the uptake of 
anthropogenic CO2 by land and ocean carbon sinks (which further includes the 
uncertainty associated with climate-carbon feedbacks that govern how carbon sinks 
are affected by CO2 (or non-CO2)-induced warming). It also indirectly accounts for 
uncertainty associated with observed temperature change and the present-day 
strength of non-CO2 forcing, in that a higher TCRE would have to be associated with 
smaller net non-CO2 forcing (e.g. due to stronger negative aerosol forcing) in order 
to remain consistent with the observational record.  
 
These above likelihood values do not, however, account for the uncertainty 
associated with future non-CO2 emission pathways, and therefore do not account for 
the critical question of how strong non-CO2 forcing will be at the time that we are 
approaching 1.5Ȃ2 °C of climate warming. Given that the majority of the non-CO2 
forcing is the result of gases and aerosols with short atmospheric lifetimes Ȃ so-ǲ-ǳ	Ȃ the strength of non-CO2 forcing is 
primarily determined by the annual rate of emissions, rather than (as is the case for 
CO2) the total accumulated emissions over time (Smith et al. 2012). Consequently, 
the level of non-CO2 emissions several decades from now will have a very large 
influence on the effective carbon budget associated with 1.5Ȃ2 °C of climate 
warming. And unlike the likelihood values associated with the climate response 
uncertainty above, there are no equivalent likelihood values that have been 
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estimated for future non-CO2 emissions pathways. Previous analyses have therefore 
considered the range of non-CO2 forcing strengths across the RCP scenarios as a 
plausible range, and have used these values to estimate a range of effective carbon 
budgets, without assigning any additional likelihood values to this range (Rogelj et 
al. 2016; Friedlingstein et al. 2014)Ǥǲǳ 
(i.e. 67% chance of remaining below the target) carbon budgets, which limits their 
usefulness to climate policy.  
 
While there is no immediate solution to the problem of how to apply likelihood 
values to the mitigation decisions that will determine future non-CO2 forcing, we 
here attempt to clarify what these human decisions mean for carbon budget 
estimates. First, for any climate target in the range of 1.5Ȃ2 °C it seems highly 
unlikely that non-CO2 emissions will follow a business-as-usual trajectory, with 
human mitigation effort concentrated solely on decreasing CO2 emissions. This then 
suggests that the lower-end of the RCP non-CO2 forcing range (which makes up 
between 7 and 15% of total forcing during the second half of this century as shown 
in Figure 2) is much more likely than the higher non-CO2 forcing in RCP8.5. This in 
turn implies that effective carbon budgets based on the current strength of non-CO2 
forcing (as in Table 2) should be taken as conservative estimates with a high 
likelihood that the eventual effective carbon budget will be closer to (but lower 
than) the CO2-only carbon budgets listed in Table 1. Second, the implication that 
emerges here for climate mitigation decision making is that while the size of CO2-
only carbon budget is governed entirely by geophysical constraints, the difference 
between CO2-only and effective carbon budgets depends primarily on human 
decisions. If we decide to aggressively mitigate non-CO2 emission such that non-CO2 
forcing at the time we reach 1.5Ȃ2 °C is small, then this will enlarge the effective 
carbon budget, thereby increasing the amount of cumulative CO2 emissions that 
would be consistent with the desired target.  
 
It is worth commenting briefly on a third source of uncertainty, which is associated 
with the climate response time to emissions. As argued above, there is evidence to 
 15 
suggest that the climate response time to CO2 emissions is small (Ricke & Caldeira 
2014), implying that CO2-induced temperature change remains relatively stable 
once emissions are stopped (Matthews & Weaver 2010). For non-CO2 agents, 
however, global temperature does change after the elimination of emissions, leading 
to non-negligible positive or negative ZECs associated with current emissions of 
different short-lived species. This is well illustrated by the case of aerosols 
emissions, which include a range of individual aerosol types that both warm and 
cool the climate. On balance, aerosols currently produce a net negative forcing, and 
decreased emissions would therefore warm the climate, though this effect would of 
course vary depending on the relative effectiveness of mitigating different aerosol 
types. In the case of short-lived greenhouse gases (such as methane or tropospheric 
ozone), decreased emissions would result in cooling in response to declining forcing. 
Matthews and Zickfeld (2012) estimated the ZEC associated with both CO2 and non-
CO2 emissions, showing that an abrupt elimination of all emissions would lead to a 
warming of a few tenths of a degree over about a decade, followed by a gradual 
cooling that returned global temperatures to close to present-day levels over the 
course of about two centuries. This result implies that complete elimination of 
current non-CO2 emissions would likely cause a small initial warming as aerosol 
forcing abruptly dissipates, and would then gradually reverse in line with eventually 
declining non-CO2 greenhouse gas forcing. Again, however, this potential warming 
response depends primarily on human mitigation decisions, and not on any inherent 
geophysical constraints.  
 
A final source of uncertainty relates to the potential effect of important processes 
that are still missing from, or poorly represented in, the current generation of Earth 
system models. For example, accounting for CO2 release from thawing permafrost 
would decrease the size of the CO2-only carbon budget, though like other carbon 
cycle feedbacks, the effect of permafrost melt does not invalidate the concept of a 
carbon budget and the associated linear relationship between warming and 
cumulative CO2 emissions (MacDougall et al. 2015). Changing fire dynamics could 
also have a important consequences for the carbon cycle (Landry et al. 2015) and 
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therefore for carbon budget estimates. In general however, the uncertainty 
surrounding human decisions has much greater bearing on future warming 
estimates than do these geophysical uncertainties (Hawkins & Sutton 2009; Fyke & 
Matthews 2015). And as outlined above, human decision uncertainty is also an 
important direct contributor to the differences in effective carbon budget estimates, 
which emphasizes the critical importance of effective climate mitigation decision-
making that reflects and accommodates for fundamental geophysical uncertainty. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Despite the large uncertainty range on any estimate of a carbon budget for a given 
climate target, the idea that there is a finite amount of CO2 that is allowed to be 
emitted remains an appealing way of framing the climate mitigation challenge. CO2-
only carbon budgets represent a simple and robust quantity that emerges from a set 
of increasingly well-understood processes that govern the climate response to 
cumulative CO2 emissions. Effective carbon budgets, which define the allowable CO2 
emissions for a given climate target while allowing for additional warming from 
non-CO2 emissions, are less robust because they are less governed by geophysical 
constraints. This means that the eventual size of the effective carbon budget will be 
highly influenced by human decisions and in particular by our ability to mitigate 
emissions of short-lived greenhouse gases and aerosols.  
 
This responsiveness of the size of effective carbon budgets to human decisions 
implies the need for climate mitigation strategies that are able to adapt to new 
information about the climate response to emissions (Millar, Allen, et al. 2016), as 
well as to our success or failure at aggressively mitigating emissions of short-lived 
species. It may therefore be less important to precisely estimate the size of the 
effective carbon budget now, as it is to implement strong non-CO2 emission 
mitigation policies that would enlarge the carbon budget, in parallel with efforts to 
mitigate emissions of CO2 themselves. However, it is also crucial that efforts to curb 
non-CO2 emissions do not replace mitigation of CO2, as this would increase both 
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peak and long-term warming (Pierrehumbert 2014). While the CO2-only budget 
represents a firm (if uncertain) upper limit on total allowable emissions, the smaller 
effective carbon budget is a quantity that will become more clear only as we move 
forward with ambitious climate mitigation efforts aimed at limiting climate 
warming to the 1.5Ȃ2 °C range committed to in the Paris Climate Agreement. 
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Table 1: Best-estimates of the TCRE (Transient Climate Response to cumulative CO2 
Emissions) from climate models and observational data, with corresponding 
estimates of the CO2-only carbon budgets associated with a given amount of CO2-
induced global temperature increase. Values in parentheses are in units of CO2 
rather than C, where 1 tonne of C = 3.67 tonnes of CO2, and all carbon budget values 
are rounded to the nearest 5 Gt. 
  
CO2-only Carbon budgets 
 
TCRE per °C 1.5 °C 2 °C 
CMIP5 models 
1.6 °C / 1000 GtC 
 (0.44 °C / 1000 GtCO2) 
625 GtC 
 (2290 GtCO2) 
940 GtC 
 (3445 GtCO2) 
1250 GtC 
 (4585 GtCO2) 
Observations 
1.35 °C / 1000 GtC 
 (0.37 °C / 1000 GtCO2) 
740 GtC 
 (2715 GtCO2) 
1110 GtC 
 (4070 GtCO2) 
1480 GtC 
 (5425 GtCO2) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Best-estimates of the TCREeff (ǲǡǳ
response to cumulative CO2 emissions, scaled upwards to account for additional 
non-CO2 warming) from climate models and observational data, with corresponding 
estimates of the effective carbon budgets associated with a given amount of global 
temperature increase resulting from all human emissions. Values in parentheses are 
in units of CO2 rather than C, where 1 tonne of C = 3.67 tonnes of CO2, and all carbon 
budget values are rounded to the nearest 5 Gt. 
 
  
Effective Carbon budgets 
 
Effective TCRE per °C 1.5 °C 2 °C 
CMIP5 models 
1.86 °C / 1000 GtC 
 (0.51 °C / 1000 GtCO2) 
540 GtC 
 (1980 GtCO2) 
805 GtC 
 (2950 GtCO2) 
1075 GtC 
 (3940 GtCO2) 
Observations 
1.78 °C / 1000 GtC 
 (0.49 °C / 1000 GtCO2) 
560 GtC 
 (2055 GtCO2) 
845 GtC 
 (3100 GtCO2) 
1125 GtC 
 (4125 GtCO2) 
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Figure 1 Relationship between the cumulative CO2 emissions and CO2-induced 
temperature change for two different estimates of the TCRE. CO2-only carbon 
budget ranges for 1.5Ȃ2 °C associated with this range of TCRE values are marked on 
the horizontal axis. The two values of the TCRE illustrated here are the median of 
the ensemble of CMIP5 Earth-system models (1.6 °C/1000 GtC; blue line) and the 
observationally-constrained best estimate (1.35 °C/1000 GtC; red line) (Gillett et al. 
2013). 
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Figure 2: Ratio of CO2 to total anthropogenic forcing from the IPCC forcing estimates 
(dotted line) and the CMIP5 model ensemble (solid lines). IPCC forcing data is 
calculated according to Myhre et al. (2013), updated to the year 2015. CMIP5 forcing 
data is approximated here using forcing data from Meinshausen et al. (2011), which 
gives forcing estimates using the MAGICC model, scaled to match the mean response 
of the CMIP5 model ensemble. 
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Figure 3: Effective carbon budget estimates (per 1 °C), based on a constant CO2-only 
budget scaled using the ratios of CO2 to total anthropogenic forcing shown in Figure 
2. Both model-based (solid lines) and observationally-based (dashed line) estimates 
of the effective carbon budgets are shown, calculated using their respective CO2-
only budget estimates from Table 1 (thin horizontal lines). Values in Table 2 
correspond to the year-2015 values taken from these time-series (where the model-
based estimate for 2015 is consistent with the RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios, 
rather than with RCP6 which shows a slightly higher year-2015 effective carbon 
budget). 
 
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
1950 2000 2050 2100
E
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 c
a
r
b
o
n
 b
u
d
g
e
t 
(G
tC
 p
e
r
 °
C
)
Year
CMIP5 RCP2.6
CMIP5 RCP4.5
CMIP5 RCP6
CMIP5 RCP8.5
CMIP5 Historical
IPCC Historical
Model-based CO2-only budget
Observationally-based CO2-only budget
